A critical review of airport privatisation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Case study of Medina Airport by Chaouk, Mohammed et al.
1 
 
A Critical Review of Airport Privatisation in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia: Case study of Medina Airport 
Mohammed Chaouk, Romano Pagliari, Chikage Miyoshi 
Abstract 
Saudi Arabia is one of the few Middle-Eastern states to have undertaken an airport 
privatisation programme. Medina was one of several airports that have been privatised 
in Saudi Arabia when it was awarded to Tibah Airports in 2012 under a Build-Transfer-
Operate agreement. This paper compares the performance of Medina airport in terms 
of traffic, revenues, costs and profitability with projections made during the due-
diligence period prior to the airport’s privatisation. We found that the airport 
benefitted from favourable market conditions post-privatisation which facilitated the 
attainment of some important achievements with regard to route development and 
customer service. However, we also found that profitability was lower than forecast 
during the due-diligence process prior to privatisation and that this was mainly as a 
result of unexpected interventions by the regulator GACA. We have raised important 
policy implications for future privatisation transactions, the success of which is 
crucially dependent on the Kingdom minimising the level of regulatory risk facing 
potential investors. There are cultural dimensions, human resources strategies and 
administrative governance issues in addition to the very specific nature of the socio-
political environment which are all factors that need to be considered in future 
privatisation transactions.  
Keywords 
Airport privatisation, airport performance, regulatory system, BTO, airport BTO 
agreement. 
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1. Introduction 
Privatisation of state-owned utilities has its origins in the industrial strategy pursued 
by the Conservative Government in the UK during the 1980s. Indeed, the first 
significant airport privatisation was the sale in 1987, through an IPO, of the then 
British Airports Authority (Doganis, 1992). The perceived success of the first 
transaction combined with favourable market conditions (spurred largely by strong 
economic growth and deregulation) and the need to finance capacity expansion, 
inspired other governments to adopt airport privatisation as an instrument of policy 
(Ison et al., 2011; Vogel, 2011). The BAA privatisation was followed in the 1990s, by 
the partial sales of Vienna and Copenhagen extending to much larger scale 
transactions involving the airport networks of New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, 
South Africa, Mexico and Argentina (Forsyth, 2006; Graham, 2011). By 2017, over 600 
airports, constituting almost 14% of airports worldwide, had been either partially or 
fully privatised. The scale of privatisation has been greater in Europe where 31% of 
airports have some form of private sector ownership.  Latin America and Asia-Pacific 
follow with 26% and 12% respectively. A very small number of airports have been 
privatised in Africa, the Middle East and North America (ACI, 2017). Although the 
majority of airports today are still publicly-owned, it is expected that in future, more 
governments will continue to adopt the privatisation model spurred largely by the 
perceived benefits (Graham, 2011; Rikhy et al., 2014). Humphreys (1999) found that 
governments can benefit from privatisation by enabling airports to access capital 
markets to finance capacity expansion, obviating the need for state subsidy. Airport 
privatisation can also improve efficiency and financial performance (Forsyth, 2002), 
quality of service (Hooper et al., 2000) and management structure Assaf (2010).  
While the financial gains that could potentially accrue to the state from the sale of 
airport assets can also act as an important motive to pursue a privatisation programme 
(Niemeier, 2002).  
The impact of airport privatisation, as reported in the literature, appears to have been 
generally quite positive. According to Oum et al. (2006) privatisation has achieved 
higher efficiencies in Europe. Chen et al. (2017) argue that improved techno-economic 
efficiency has been achieved by privatised airports in Europe and Asia-Pacific.  Barros 
and Dieke (2007) concluded that efficiency is higher in privately owned airports in 
Italy compared to those under public ownership. Perelman and Serebrisky (2012) 
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found that private airports in Latin American countries are generally more efficient 
than those under public ownership. 
The scale of airport privatisation in the Middle-East region, in contrast to Europe, has 
been quite limited.  In addition to Saudi Arabia, which is the main focus of this paper, 
airports have been privatised in Jordan, Egypt and Oman. In the case of Oman, the 
privatisation experience was short-lived. A private consortium secured a 25 years-
concession contract to manage Oman’s airports in September 2001. However, in 2004, 
one consortium member, BAA, decided to pull out of its commitment after failing to 
reach an agreement with the state over the expansion of Seeb Airport (Ali, 2004). 
Amman’s new Queen Alia International Airport, built in 2007 is managed by a public-
private consortium under a 25-year BOT agreement.  
Saudi Arabia has been the most active in privatising its airports. This paper aims to 
review the impact of the privatisation on the operational and financial performance of 
Medina airport. We provide an overview of the Kingdom’s economy and recent policy 
developments in the airport sector in sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, we describe 
Medina Airport’s operating characteristics followed by a commentary on the 
regulatory framework and privatisation process that was adopted by Saudi Arabia.  We 
review the operational and financial impacts of privatisation on Medina Airport in 
section 6 while the paper concludes with a discussion in Section 7.  
2. Saudi Arabian Economy 
Accounting for 22% of the world’s oil reserves has enabled Saudi Arabia’s to achieve 
the fastest growth of any economy since the 1970s (OPEC, 2017). This oil dividend has 
provided the volume of funds to not only finance and support other sectors of its 
economy (i.e. defence) but also to supply aid to neighbouring economies in the Middle 
East and other regions (Alkhathlan, 2013). Despite price fluctuations over the past 40 
years, the oil sector still accounts for approximately 90% of export revenues and 45% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) (General Authority for Statistics, 2016). This 
dependency on oil does, however, make it vulnerable to the effects of adverse 
movements in price. In recognition of this reality, the government recently set out a 
plan to reduce oil-dependency in a new national strategy titled “Vision 2030” which 
seeks to support greater diversification by introducing reforms designed to galvanise 
other sectors of the economy such as tourism, education, health and manufacturing.  
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Saudi Arabia’s population in 2016 was reported to be 31.4 million of which 37% are 
non-nationals. The majority of the population are mainly concentrated around 
Makkah, Riyadh (the capital) and the Eastern Province (Figure 1). In the same year, 
the GDP of Saudi Arabia amounted to US$653.2 billion. This corresponds to a GDP 
per capita of US$20,813; a rank of 34th globally and 5th in the Middle East (World 
Economic Forum, 2016). 
 
Figure 1 Major cities, main airports, and population distribution by provinces of Saudi 
Arabia 
Source: General Authority for Statistics (2016) 
Saudi Arabia has a long coastal area adjacent to the Red Sea and Gulf Sea. It shares 
land borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait in the north, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Bahrain in the East and with Oman and Yemen in the South. Saudi Arabia is also the 
home of the two holiest sites of the Muslim Faith, Makkah and Medina, where millions 
of its adherents arrive every year to perform religious Pilgrimage1. 
                                                             
1 Islamic Pilgrimage, or Hajj, is a mandatory duty in the Islamic Religion which should be carried out at least 
once in the lifetime of a Muslim adult. Umrah is another form of pilgrimage to Mecca which can be performed 
anytime during the year. 
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3. Saudi Arabia’s Airports 
There are 6 international, 8 regional and 13 domestic airports in Saudi Arabia and 
these are all listed in Table 1 in addition to their respective 2015 traffic volumes. The 
locations of the four largest international airports are shown in Figure 1. 
Saudi Arabia has achieved high air traffic growth in recent years. This has in part been 
due to the effects of liberalisation which has permitted the competitive entry of new 
low cost airlines to rival state-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines’ domination of the 
domestic market. In 2015, the airport system handled 81.8 million passengers, a 96% 
increase on 2007 (GACA, 2008; GACA, 2015).  
Table 1 Traffic Handled by Saudi Arabian Airports in 2015 
Source: GACA (2015) 
The top four airports account for 84% of the Kingdom’s total traffic volume. Jeddah is 
the Kingdom’s commercial capital and its airport also serves pilgrimage traffic to and 
from the holy sites at Makkah. Riyadh airport serves the capital city while Dammam 
Airport IATA Code Air Transport Movements Passengers Cargo (kg) 
Jeddah JED 212,799 30,093,539 716,610 
Riyadh RUH 172,754 22,545,296 328,505 
Dammam DMM 84,803 9,407,304 95,321 
Medina MED 48,296 6,306,222 10,728 
Abha  AHB 27,095 3,115,068 2,982 
Tabuk TUU 11,694 1,310,519 1,711 
Taif  TIF 10,091 1,157,188 403 
Al-Gassim  ELQ 13,670 1,443,711 846 
Hail HAS 6,815 800,982 1,110 
Gazan  GIZ 13,505 1,735,775 2,907 
Al-Baha  ABT 3,205 377,532 102 
Wadi Dawaser  WAE 1,885 111,468 8 
Sharurah  SHW 2,347 202,293 115 
Turaif  TUI 1,020 62,968 33 
Bisha  BHH 3,653 376,791 123 
Ar'ar  RAE 2,374 240,822 363 
Wedjh  EJH 1,122 63,651 20 
Rafha  RAH 1,182 70,396 33 
Nejran  EAM 1,989 227,232 171 
Al-Qaisumah AQI 2,192 138,650 90 
Al-Jouf  AJF 4,623 450,505 567 
Al-Ahsa  HOF 7,511 408,780 425 
Al-Gurayat  URY 1,908 207,437 310 
Yanbu YNB 9,238 960,144 209 
Al-Ula ULH 474 23,128 1 
Dawadami  DWD 416 23,471 2 
Rabigh  - 32 81 0 
TOTAL  646,693 81,860,953 1,163,695 
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serves traffic driven largely by activities related to oil fields located in the Eastern 
Province. Medina hosts the second holiest religious sites and receives, like Makkah, 
considerable volumes of pilgrimage traffic. 
IATA forecasts that traffic in Saudi Arabia will increase by 4.1% per annum, the third 
highest in the Middle East, behind Qatar (5.9%) and United Arab Emirates (4.1%), and 
higher than the average growth per annum of Europe (2.5%), North America (2.8%), 
and Latin America (3.8%) (IATA, 2016). This expectation has created an urgency 
around the need to accelerate the delivery of new investment in order to enable the 
airport system to cope with both immediate capacity bottlenecks and to accommodate 
future growth. 
Historically, all the airports in the Kingdom were owned and operated by the 
government through the General Authority for Civil Aviation (GACA). As well as 
owning airports, GACA was and still remains the designated regulator of air transport 
in the Kingdom. In 2007, at the behest of the Government, GACA undertook an initial 
phase of airport privatisation using various public-private partnership models, 
deploying a mix of relatively short-term limited scope management contracts and 
larger more extensive project finance / BTO transactions. In 2007, investors were 
invited to participate in a competitive tender to operate management contracts at the 
airports of Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam.  
The German airport company, Fraport, secured a 6-year management contract in 
2008 to operate both Jeddah and Riyadh airports. Both airports were subsequently 
transferred back to full GACA control in 2014. The scope of these management 
contracts was relatively limited with Fraport supplying both airports with a range of 
technical and advisory services (Fraport, 2014). 
Separately, at Jeddah, in 2011 GACA awarded a 20-year BTO contract to a consortium 
led by the Bin Laden Group and Aéroports de Paris to expand, refurbish and manage 
the Hajj terminal. The two other terminals (North and South) are currently in the 
process of being replaced by two new terminals also being built by the Bin Laden 
Group at a cost of US$7.5 billion. In April 2017, GACA awarded a 20-year management 
contract to a consortium comprising of Changi Airport Group and Saudi Naval 
Services to manage airside operations and the newly built Terminals. However, the 
contract was abruptly terminated by GACA in February 2018 following an internal 
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review which raised some important concerns as stated in the official statement issued 
by GACA (GACA, 2018).  
At Riyadh, Fraport operated a management contract between 2008 and 2014. GACA 
then assumed full control. In February 2016, GACA awarded a management contract 
to ARI, a subsidiary of the Irish-owned Dublin Airport Authority to operate the newly 
constructed Terminal 5.   
In 2008, Changi Airport Group secured a six-year contract to co-operate with GACA 
in the management of Dammam; this was extended by one year in 2015. The airport 
is now under the full control of GACA with continued technical advisory support being 
provided by Changi Airport Group.   
Medina Airport was privatised in 2012. The Turkish airport operator, TAV, led the 
Tibah consortium (a joint venture between the Turkish company TAV Airports and 
two Saudi national companies, Saudi Oger and Al-Rajhi Holding Group) that was 
successful in winning the tender for a 25-year BTO contract to manage the airport 
(Youssef, 2013). Tibah Airports Operations Co. Ltd paid US$249 million to GACA as 
winners of a competitive tendering process to secure the rights to manage the airport. 
Table 2 Privatised Airports in Saudi Arabia (Current Situation) 
Airports / Terminal Types of Contract Year Period Operator 
Medina BTO 2012 25 Years Tibah 
Riyadh (Terminal 5) Management Contract 2016 5 Years ARI 
Jeddah (Hajj Terminal)  BTO 2007 15 Years Bin Laden  
Jeddah Management Contract 2017 20 Years CAG 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources 
4. Medina Airport 
Prince Mohammad bin Abdulaziz International Airport is located close to the city of 
Medina; home of the Muslim World’s second holiest site. This is where the Prophet 
Muhammad is buried. Pilgrims who arrive for Hajj or Umrah by air can enter the 
Kingdom via two entry points only, with Medina Airport being one of them. Medina is 
also the destination of Muslims in the Umrah Season, which extends throughout the 
year and reaches its peak in the month of Ramadan. 
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Before it was transformed into an international airport in 2012, Medina Airport had 
been facilitating the access of pilgrims to the Holy City either through domestic 
services or through a limited volume of international flights scheduled during the Hajj 
season. Limitations on the number of Hajj flights using Medina was set by GACA. Hajj 
traffic makes Medina Airport the fourth busiest in KSA behind the international 
airports of Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam (GACA, 2010). The airport is an important 
asset to the local economy which depends heavily on inbound religious tourism 
(Youssef, 2013). 
In 2007, the airport reached its maximum capacity of three million passengers per 
year. GACA’s attempts to implement a 2006 master plan which included a new 
terminal had become increasingly frustrated by bureaucratic constraints and funding 
limitations. The opportunity to privatise the airport was further complicated by 
resourcing challenges largely driven by the underutilisation of the airport’s employees 
and facilities outside of the pilgrimage seasons; in 2012, traffic during the Hajj season 
represented 38% of the total volume for that year (Tibah, 2012).   
However, two important reforms were subsequently undertaken which helped pave 
the way for the airport’s privatisation. Firstly, GACA adopted ICAO’s principle of full 
cost recovery with regard to capital investments, which allowed for increased 
aeronautical charges to be levied on international passengers at Medina Airport. In 
addition, the Government introduced a new one-way travel policy which permitted 
passenger arrivals at Jeddah followed by departures from Medina and vice versa 
(Youssef, 2013). The latter reform played a role in increasing the traffic outside Hajj 
season. In 2016, the share of Hajj season represented 11% from the total traffic for that 
year (Tibah, 2016). 
The airport handled 7.8 million passengers in 2017, of which 70% was domestic and 
30% international. The largest carrier at Medina is Saudi Arabian which accounts for 
45% of scheduled seating capacity; Turkish airlines is the second most important 
accounting for 10%. The largest low-cost carrier serving the airport is Flynas which 
supplies 6% of total scheduled seating capacity at the airport (CAPA, 2018). Overall, 
low cost carriers account for 14% of total seats supplied at Medina (CAPA, 2018). The 
top three destinations are: Riyadh, Jeddah and Istanbul. 
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5. Medina Airport privatization process 
It had become apparent that existing facilities at the airport would not be sufficient to 
cope with future traffic volumes given the state’s intention to remove restrictions on 
religious tourism and plans to further liberalise the domestic airline market.  In 2009, 
GACA, with the help of the International Finance Corporation, started the process of 
preparing the airport for privatisation. The model that they agreed on was to be based 
on a 25-year BTO concession contract. For this purpose, GACA set its minimum 
technical requirements (MTRs) for the project, which included the setting of operating 
procedures and required service levels that private operators would be expected to 
meet.  The qualified bidders were invited in March 2010 to submit their bids. A series 
of discussions took place in the following months between each bidder and GACA.  
Eventually, out of the eight qualified bidders, four were shortlisted: Malaysian 
Airports (Malaysia), Houston (USA), Aéroports de Paris (France) and Tibah (Turkey). 
A scoring system was used to evaluate each bid where both technical and financial 
proposals were allocated equal weight.  Under the financial proposals, bidders were 
expected to declare the bid price they would be prepared to pay to win the contract and 
the proportion of operating revenues they would be expected to share with GACA over 
the lifetime of the BTO contract.  The technical proposal incorporated all non-financial 
aspects including proposed investments, design solutions and service standards. The 
bid achieving the highest score would be awarded the concession contract (Youssef, 
2013).   
The concession contract was finally awarded to Tibah Airports, a consortium 
consisting of the Turkish operator, TAV Havalimanlari Holding, and the Saudi 
companies, Al Rajhi Holdings Group and Saudi Oger Limited. TAV was an established 
airport concessions operator with extensive experience in both airport and related 
service company management both in Turkey and across the Middle-East, Balkan and 
North African regions.  In October 2011, the concession contract was signed between 
GACA and Tibah and in June 2012, the airport handover was completed (TAV, 2011). 
Under the terms and conditions of the BTO contract, Tibah was committed to: 
delivering a new 158,000 m2 fully air-conditioned passenger terminal, a new 90,000 
m2 Hajj terminal, extending the existing runway, building new taxiways, airfield 
lighting systems, aprons, access roads and parking facilities. These projects were 
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expected to be delivered over a 3-year period at a cost of US$1.14 billion. In return for 
the rights and obligations stipulated in the contract, Tibah was required to transfer 
54.5% of the annual turnover of its Media operations to GACA in the form of a 
concession fee.  
Table 3 Contract structure and requirements for Medina Airport 
Concession Type Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
Concession Duration 25 years starting 2012 
Construction Duration Up to 3 years 
Capital Investment US$1.14 Billion 
Concession Fee 54.5% of Gross Revenues per calendar year must be paid to GACA 
Source: Medina Airport BTO Agreement 
6.  Medina Airport privatization outcomes 
6.1 Traffic 
Figure 2 below compares forecast and actual air transport movement volumes at 
Medina over the period 2010 to 2016.  Tibah forecasted a decline in traffic between 
2011 and 2012 due mainly to the effects on volume of imposing operating restrictions 
designed to facilitate runway construction work. However, traffic volumes over the 
entire period actually exceeded expectations.  On average, over the period, air 
transport movement volumes were under-estimated by a factor of 57%.   
 
Figure 2 Medina Airport’s air traffic movements from 2010 to 2016 actual and financial 
model 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Passenger traffic volumes similarly exceeded expectations.  Prior to privatisation, 
between 2005 and 2012 passenger traffic on average was growing at a rate of 10% per 
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year.  This accelerated to an average annual rate of 14% in the years following 
privatisation. By 2016, Medina was handling an annual throughput of 6.5 million 
passengers with connections to 203 destinations. Following privatisation, the number 
of destinations increased significantly, by almost 20%, to reach 242 by 2016. Leading 
markets in terms of passenger traffic in 2013 were: Egypt, Turkey, UAE, Indonesia and 
Iran.  Between 2013 and 2016 additional routes were added to airports in Turkey while 
there was a significant decline in traffic to and from Iran due to the cancellation of air 
traffic rights.  These traffic losses were more than compensated for by significant 
improvement in volumes on routes to Egypt, Pakistan and Malaysia (Table 4). 
Saudi Arabian Airlines accounts for the largest share of the international passenger 
market at Medina followed by Turkish Airlines and Egypt Air. However, there was a 
decrease in the percentage shares of international passengers carried by Saudi Arabian 
Airlines from 38% in 2013 to 27% in 2016. Table 5 lists the top ten airlines operating 
to Medina in terms of the percentage of international passengers in both 2013 and 
2016. 
Table 4 Medina Airport's destination ranking by PAX in 2013 and 2016 
 2013 2016 
Rank Country Pax Country Pax 
1 Egypt 372,939 Turkey 2,160,060 
2 Turkey 370,857 Egypt 1,971,064 
3 UAE 233,491 UAE 1,601,734 
4 Indonesia 136,713 Pakistan 1,130,012 
5 Iran 103,489 Indonesia 844,702 
6 Jordan 91,230 Algeria 665,907 
7 Malaysia 85,814 Qatar 470,218 
8 Algeria 67,395 Malaysia 367,036 
9 Qatar 56,989 India 336,409 
10 Pakistan 12,428 Jordan 328,122 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
There was also an increase in the number of airlines serving the airport; from 51 in 
2012 and 59 in 2016.  The increase was mainly accounted for by low cost carriers, 
offering connections to new markets in Turkey, Iran and Asia; this was largely as 
consequence of the airport’s route development strategy which was geared to focussing 
on tapping additional growth from regions where higher concentrations of Muslim 
populations reside. 
12 
 
Table 5 Top Ten Airlines in Int'l passengers market share percentage in 2013 and 2016 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Furthermore, following the completion of construction works for the new runway and 
taxiways in 2014, Medina Airport’s Aerodrome Reference Code was upgraded to 4F, 
which provided capability to accommodate A380-800 aircraft. Currently, Malaysian 
Airlines and Emirates are operating their A380s to Medina Airport.  
A comparison of passenger traffic and aircraft movements from 2012 to 2016 in the 4 
largest international airports in Saudi Arabia was done to understand if the growth 
achievements were unique to Medina, or similar to other airports in the country 
regardless of ownership type. Figure 3 does indeed confirm that at least in terms of 
passenger growth, three out of the four principal Saudi international gateways 
experienced growth of a similar scale.  
Figure 3 % growth in aircraft movements and passenger traffic between 2012 and 2016 
at Jeddah, Riyadh, Dammam and Medina airports 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Airline Int’l Passengers Market Share % in 2013 Airline 
Int’l Passengers 
Market Share % in 
2016 
Saudi Arabian 
Airlines 37% 
Saudi Arabian 
Airlines 27% 
Turkish Airlines 12% Turkish Airlines 11% 
Egypt Air 10% Egypt Air 10% 
Emirates Airline 6% Emirates Airline 7% 
Flynas 4% Flynas 7% 
Air Algerie 3% Pakistan Airlines 5% 
Pakistan Airlines 3% Qatar Airways 4% 
Atlas Jet 2% Air Algerie 2% 
Qatar Airways 2% Garuda Indonesia 2% 
Royal Jordanian 2% Royal Jordanian 2% 
Others 20% Others 22% 
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In aircraft movement terms, only Dammam comes close to matching Medina’s 
performance. This suggests that to a fairly significant extent, general market 
conditions played a considerable role in accounting for traffic growth in addition to 
the airport’s own route development initiatives. 
6.2 Financial performance 
In comparing actual financial performance with that predicted by their due-diligence 
model, we evaluate operating revenues, operating costs and profitability. 
6.2.1 Operating revenues 
Over the period of analysis, Medina’s operating revenues exceeded those projected by 
Tibah’s due-diligence financial model (Figure 4). The margin of error was relatively 
modest at a scale of approximately 5% per year (Tibah, 2012). This under-estimation 
was most likely due to the effect of higher than projected traffic volumes on operating 
revenues. In addition, what also transpires over the period is that a greater proportion 
of the airport’s operating revenues have been generated from non-aeronautical 
sources. Figure 5 shows that aeronautical revenues as a proportion of total operating 
revenues declined from 92% in 2014 to 83% in 2016, a considerable transformation 
achieved in a relatively short time-frame.  
Figure 4 % Actual and Model Operating revenues (in SAR) generated by Medina 2012-
2016 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Indeed, the scale of under-development in commercial revenues prior to 2015 was 
quite apparent, given the size of the airport, especially when compared to airports of a 
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similar size in other regions that appear much better able to generate higher 
proportions of their revenues from non-aeronautical sources.  
Figure 5 % breakdown in operating revenue from aeronautical and non-aeronautical 
sources at Medina 2012-2016. 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
According to ACI (2013), airports handling in the region of 1 to 5 million passengers 
annually on average generated 35% of total operating revenue from commercial 
sources. Medina’s success post-2015 coincided with the opening of the new terminal 
in 2015, an important deliverable in its BTO contractual obligations. The new building, 
designed with a much greater incorporation of design features geared to improving 
retail sales performance, accounts for the significant improvement in commercial yield 
(Figure 6). However, this is still relatively low by international standards and it is more 
likely that other factors appear to have had an inhibiting effect on sales. 
Although total revenues exceeded projections, Tibah faced an unexpected intervention 
by GACA in relation to its plan to charge third-party operators turnover-based 
concession fees on their business operations at the airport. Prior to the transfer of 
ownership, Tibah had been assured that they would have authority to collect these fees 
from ground handling, cargo and in-flight catering concessions licensed at the airport; 
this assumption formed an important element in its due-diligence financial modelling. 
Table 6 lists those charges approved by GACA prior to the signing of the BTO contract.   
However, following the sale, GACA agreed to approve only one concession fee (for 
ground handing) at a reduced rate of US$0.26 per passenger compared to US$0.66 
which, according to Tibah, had been approved during the due-diligence process.  As a 
result of this unexpected intervention by GACA, the shortfall in revenues was predicted 
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to cost Tibah approximately US$355 million over the life of the concession agreement 
(see Table 6) 
Table 6 Medina Airport's unapproved concession charges (in US$) 
 Revenue Source 
 Ground Handling Cargo In-flight catering 
GACA Approved charges (pre-sale) 0.66 per Pax 5.86 per tonne 1.03 per 
international 
departing 
passenger 
GACA Approved charges (post-sale) 0.26 per Pax n/a n/a 
Potential loss of revenue to end of 
concession 
159 million 2.9 million 193 million 
Source: Unpublished Tibah Airports Co Ltd. LTD letters to GACA 
Figure 6 shows the ratio of actual to model aeronautical and non-aeronautical 
revenues from 2012 to 2016. Actual aeronautical revenue exceeds that forecasted by 
the model over the period; this is largely the result of under-estimation in their traffic 
forecasts. Non-aeronautical revenue performance was worse than expected prior to 
2015; this may have been mainly a consequence of GACA’s intervention with regard to 
Tibah’s proposed third-party concession fees. In both 2015 and 2016, the airport’s 
revenue performance was particularly robust; this was especially so with regard to 
non-aeronautical business operations where model forecasts were exceeded by a factor 
of 35%.   
Figure 6 Ratio of actual to model aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues at 
Medina 2012-2016. 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
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6.2.2 Operating expenditure 
Over the period 2012 to 2015 the level of operating expenditure incurred by the airport 
was 46% higher than forecast (Figure 7). This was as a result of three important 
developments that were not anticipated prior to the transfer of management 
responsibility to Tibah.  
After having secured the rights to manage Medina Airport in 2012, Tibah was obliged 
to absorb additional expenditure relating to a secondment agreement with GACA. This 
involved a requirement to retain highly remunerated GACA’s employees who had been 
employed at the airport prior to privatisation. The expectation was that they would 
continue to be employed at Medina until the opening of the new terminal, when they 
would be given the option to either transfer to Tibah employment terms and 
conditions or to resign from their posts. Shortly after GACA’s employees were 
seconded to Tibah, the organisation’s legal status changed to that of an independent 
public authority. 
Figure 7 Actual and model operating expenditure (in SAR) incurred by Medina from 
2012 to 2016 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
The change of legal status meant that there was now a requirement on GACA to raise 
the salaries substantially not only of its own employees but also of those seconded to 
Tibah. Tibah were not compensated for this unexpected development and had to bear 
the additional costs in full. Furthermore, at the end of the secondment agreement, 
GACA instructed airport management to increase the salaries of those employees who 
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had chosen to remain with Tibah by a factor of 15% as compensation for leaving GACA 
to join a private sector organisation.   
The secondment agreement had also resulted in an increase in the number staff 
employed at the airport. The financial model had initially assumed that the airport 
would require 242 employees; up to 2016. However, as shown in Figure 8 below, the 
number of employees on the Tibah payroll increased to 470 in 2016. Tibah faced two 
challenges not anticipated prior to the sale of the airport. Firstly, they were soon 
confronted with the need to hire experienced non-Saudi employees at premium 
salaries to cover shortages in manpower; living in the city of Medina does not represent 
a sufficiently attractive incentive for non-Saudis, hence the need to offer higher 
salaries. Secondly, in the interim, there was a requirement to hire apprentices who 
would eventually be capable replacing the non-Saudis on completion of their training 
programmes.  
Figure 8 Actual and model staff employed by Medina Airport from 2012 to 2016. 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Tibah was also required to absorb an unexpected increase in both electricity and water 
charges that resulted from a decision by the Government to raise tariffs set by utility 
providers; GACA refused to accept this as a case of force majeure. In total, the actual 
the cumulative amount incurred in operating expenditure exceeded the financial 
model forecasts by a factor close to 50%.  
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6.2.3 Profitability 
We consider three indicators of profitability: EBITDAR, EBITDA and EBT2. Figure 9 
below shows that actual EBITDAR was broadly in line with that projected by the 
financial model. The better than expected revenue performance, appears to have offset 
the unexpected cost increases absorbed by Tibah as a result of GACA’s unsolicited 
interventions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Medina Airport’s EBITDAR (actual vs financial model) from 2012 to 2016 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
Figure 10 compares actual with forecast EBITDA. Here we incorporate the costs 
associated with payment of Tibah’s concession fee to GACA. The concession fee at the 
outset was set at 54.5% of operating revenue; this appears to be quite high when 
compared to other international projects. For example, a similar turnover-based 
concession fee has been in operation at Canadian airports for many years. Toronto 
Pearson, which is the busiest hub, handling 44.3 million passengers in 2016, paid the 
equivalent of 17% of revenues as rental to the Canadian Federal Government (GTAA, 
2016). London Luton airport in the United Kingdom, which was privatised under a 25-
year concession agreement in 1998, is also managed within a framework where the 
private operator pays a concession fee to the local municipal authority. The fee is per-
passenger based and in financial year 2005, when it handled 9.2 million passengers, 
the total amount paid in concession charges to the local municipal authority was the 
equivalent of 21% of sales turnover. 
                                                             
2 EBITDAR (Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, Amortisation and Rentals), EBITDA ((Earnings before 
Interest, Tax, Depreciation, Amortisation), EBT (Earnings before Tax) 
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Figure 10 Medina Airport’s EBITDA (actual vs financial model) from 2012 to 2016 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
The challenge of managing the airport with such a high concession fee appears to have 
prompted Tibah to re-negotiate a lower concession fee with GACA in 2014.  They were 
successful in lowering the concession fee from 54.5% to 27% of operating revenues. 
This had the effect of improving what otherwise would have been a much lower level 
of EBITDA achieved in both 2015 and 2016. In 2015, EBITDA, under the original 
concession fee would have been SAR54.6 million compared to SAR174.9 million. We 
contrast actual and forecast EBIT in Figure 11 below. 
Figure 11 Medina Airport’s EBIT (actual vs financial model) from 2012 to 2016. 
Source: Compiled by Author from Tibah Airports Co. LTD unpublished yearly reports 
What is apparent here is the effect of the opening of the new terminal in 2015.  In 
particular, the effect of higher than predicted capital costs (depreciation charges and 
interest payments) associated with the new terminal. What is particularly relevant also 
is that Tibah was, in effect, forced to comply with and implement additional requests 
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from GACA which were outside scope of the original BTO contract agreement. These 
additional requests included construction of a new temporary road access system, 
installation of an air-conditioning system in the walkway at the Hajj Plaza, the 
establishment of a temporary power supply substation, construction of Hajj terminal 
carrousels and the procurement of additional security machines. By 2016, the 
additional capital expenditure incurred by Tibah as a result of new obligations 
imposed by GACA amounted to US$35.1 million, which represents approximately 3% 
of the original lifetime capital investment requirement (Table 7).   
Table 7 GACA's additional requests after agreement (in US$) 
Item Cost 
Temporary access road 1.0 million 
Walkway air-conditioning 3.5 million 
Temporary power supply substation 13.5 million 
Procurement of security machines 14.5 million 
Additional four carrousels at Hajj Terminal 1.1 million 
Other governmental agency requests 1.1 million 
Airport security buildings 0.4 million 
Source: Unpublished Tibah Airports Co Ltd. LTD letters to GACA 
An additional amount of US$6.65 million was invested which was related to 
operational activities but not accounted for in the financial model. 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
In 2016, GACA announced that all international, regional and domestic airports in 
Saudi Arabia should be privatised by 2020 (GACA, 2016). Relative to the Middle East 
region, Saudi Arabia, thus far has been quite bold in terms of its ambitions to reform 
and modernise its airport sector and in the embrace of the public-private partnership 
(PPP) model of privatisation. Of all Middle-East states, the Kingdom has proved, thus 
far, to be the most enthusiastic proponent of PPP in the airport sector.  
Medina airport was one of the first to be privatised in Saudi Arabia.  Furthermore, the 
Medina transaction involved a greater degree of commercial risk transfer compared to 
the other transactions where GACA had decided to deploy relatively limited-scope 
management contracts. There are lessons to be learned from this experience if Saudi 
Arabia is to make a success of its airport privatisation ambitions.  
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Tibah had under-estimated the growth in traffic volumes in their due-diligence 
modelling. Highly favourable market conditions, which to some extent was due to low 
cost carrier expansion and a more rigorous and commercial approach by the new 
operator to route development, appears to have produced higher than forecast traffic 
volumes. Indeed, their route development achievements were recognised in 2018 
when the airport was awarded the Routes prize3 for the best route development 
strategy in the 4 to 20 million annual passengers category within the Africa and Middle 
East region.  
Stronger than expected traffic growth in turn generated higher revenues compared to 
that predicted by their due-diligence forecasting models. The new terminal built by 
Tibah, which opened in 2015, was also able to deliver a more extensive retail and 
commercial offer to passengers, achieving higher levels of sales penetration and spend 
and in turn delivering a larger proportion of revenue from higher margin non-
aeronautical activities.  Furthermore, there appears to have been a very obvious and 
noticeable improvement in passenger customer experience at Medina as the airport 
was rated as the best airport in the Middle East region in the 10-15 million passengers 
per year category by the widely respected and recognised ACI Airport Service Quality 
(ASQ) award programme in 2018. However, by international standards, there was a 
level of under-achievement in its ability to grow the proportion of revenues from non-
aeronautical activities, especially when compared to airports of similar size in other 
regions. This suggests there are limitations imposed by the type of market serving the 
airport or that there are still opportunities for further improvement. 
However, these achievements have been more than offset by significant under-
estimation of both operating costs which means that the overall returns achieved by 
the private operator have been much lower than forecast during the due-diligence 
period.   
Firstly, Tibah under-estimated the human resource requirements as they struggled to 
recruit sufficient numbers of experienced personnel. Secondly, they had failed to 
anticipate a significant increase in personnel costs as a result of a change in GACA’s 
legal status prior to receiving employees transferring from GACA. Thirdly, and 
                                                             
3 Routes is the leading organiser of global and regional airline network planning and airport route development 
events. These bring together airports and airlines.  The awards are agreed by panels of airline network 
planning specialists.  
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perhaps more importantly, Tibah experienced challenges stemming almost entirely 
from a series of unilateral and unsolicited interventions by GACA after they had taken 
full management control of the airport. GACA insisted that Tibah finance and deliver 
additional capital expenditure and amend plans to levy concession charges on various 
third-party business operations at the airport. Both of these interventions had 
implications on the level of profitability of Tibah’s Medina investment. There was no 
recourse within Saudi Arabia for Tibah to challenge GACA’s interventions or to seek 
judicial review of their actions within the existing regulatory framework in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Fundamentally, this problem largely stems from the fact that institutional 
arrangements and regulatory mechanisms with regard to the Kingdom’s airport 
system remain poorly developed and may need reform if the state is to make a success 
of its proposed airport privatisation ambitions. ICAO recommends that state-
sponsored regulators are independent of both airports and airlines (ICAO, 2004).  In 
the case of the Medina public-private partnership contract, GACA functions as both 
owner of the asset and regulator of airports.  This arrangement is clearly problematic 
in the sense that firstly, there appears to be a very obvious conflict of interest and 
secondly both parties have no resource to independent arbitration in the event of a 
dispute. The concession agreement for Bangalore Airport in India, for instance, 
contains provision for independent arbitration and dispute resolution. Furthermore, 
the airport’s aeronautical charges are controlled by a state-sponsored regulator AERA 
which is operationally and institutionally independent from the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation (owner of the airport concession).   
Not only does BTO appear to be the most preferred PPP model but the Government is 
also expected to favour an enhanced role for foreign investors in managing airport 
concessions with Saudi-owned interests within bidding consortia expected to be 
limited to 25% (CAPA, 2016). Generating sufficient foreign investor interest in future 
transactions will be critical to the success of the Kingdom’s airport privatisation 
ambitions. However, this will also depend to some extent on Saudi Arabia maintaining 
a reputation with international investors for being able to provide the necessary 
framework and establishing the required conditions for public private partnerships to 
succeed. Arbitrary interventions and the abrupt termination of contracts will not have 
enhanced Saudi Arabia’s prospects for achieving successful public-private 
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partnerships in its airport sector.  Success will also to a large extent be dependent on 
the socio-political trajectory the Kingdom takes and also the significant human 
resource challenges that are expected to intensify in the years ahead.   
References 
ACI. (2017). Policy brief: Airport ownership, economic regulation and financial 
performance. 1. Montreal, Canada. Retrieved from 
http://www.aci.aero/media/ab5e7076-425c-4f13-b6a2-
2e1a45a48a79/Up8q8Q/Publications/Airport Economics and Statistics/Policy 
Brief: Airport ownership, economic regulation and financial performance/airport-
ownership-economic-regulation-and-financial-performance-2017.pdf. 
Ali, J. (2004). GCC Insights: Oman’s privatisation drive suffers setback. Gulf News. 
Retrieved from http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/gcc-insights-oman-146-s-
privatisation-drive-suffers-setback-1.337818 
Alkhathlan, K. A. (2013). Contribution of oil in economic growth of Saudi Arabia. 
Applied Economics Letters, 20(4), 343–348. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.703310 
Assaf, A. (2010). The cost efficiency of Australian airports post privatisation: A 
Bayesian methodology. Tourism Management, 31(2), 267–273. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2009.03.005 
Barros, C., & Dieke, P. (2007). Performance evaluation of Italian airports: A data 
envelopment analysis. Journal of Air Transport Management, 13(4), 184–191. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2007.03.001 
CAPA. (2016). Saudi airport privatisation ramps up as oil prices continue to fall. 
Retrieved from https://centreforaviation.com/insights/analysis/saudi-airport-
privatisation-ramps-up-as-oil-prices-continue-to-fall-264772 
Chen, Y. H., Lai, P. L., & Piboonrungroj, P. (2017). The relationship between airport 
performance and privatisation policy: A nonparametric metafrontier approach. 
Journal of Transport Geography, 62(June), 229–235. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2017.06.005 
Doganis, R. (1992). The airport business. London: Routledge. 
Forsyth, Peter. (2002). Privatisation and regulation of Australian and New Zealand 
airports. Journal of Air Transport Management, 8(1), 19–28. 
Forsyth, Peter. (2006). Airport Policy in Australia and New Zealand: Privatisation, 
Light Handed Regulation and Performance. Aviation Infrastructure Performance: 
A Study in Comparative Political Economy. 
Fraport. (2014). Jeddah, Riyadh International Airport Management Support & 
Training. Retrieved from 
http://www.fraport.com/content/fraport/en/misc/binaer/fraport-
group/fraport/fraport-worldwide1/consulting/references/airport-
strategy/strategy-jeddah--riyadh/jcr:content.file/rs_stra_jed_ruh_online.pdf 
24 
 
GACA. (2008). Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Retrieved from 
https://gaca.gov.sa/scs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1442842692891&ssbinary=true 
GACA. (2010). Statistical Yearbook 2010. Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Retrieved from 
https://gaca.gov.sa/scs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1442842692915&ssbinary=true 
GACA. (2015). Statistical Yearbook 2015. Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Retrieved from 
https://gaca.gov.sa/scs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1442848351231&ssbinary=true 
GACA. (2016). President of GACA Outlines Future Plans. Retrieved March 15, 2017, 
from https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-gb/news/president-of-gaca-outlines-future-
plans 
GACA. (2018). Official Statement on King Abdul Aziz International Airport. 
Retrieved December 24, 2018, from https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-
gb/news/gacanews-21022018-hf01 
General Authority for Statistics (2016). Demographic Research Bulletin 2016. 
Retrieved December 19, 2017, from https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/en-
demographic-research-2016_1.xls 
Gillen, D. (2011). The evolution of airport ownership and governance. Journal of Air 
Transport Management, 17(1), 3–13. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2010.10.003 
Graham, A. (2011). The objectives and outcomes of airport privatisation. Research in 
Transportation Business and Management, 1(1), 3–14. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2011.05.004 
GTAA. (2016). Annual Report 2016. Toronto. Retrieved from 
http://world.honda.com/content/dam/site/world/investors/cq_img/library/ann
ual_report/FY201603_annual_report_e_02.pdf 
Hooper, P., Cain, R. & White, S. (2000). The privatisation of Australia’s airports. 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 36(3), 
181–204. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1366-5545(99)00032-0 
Humphreys, I. (1999). Privatisation and commercialisation. Changes in UK airport 
ownership patterns. Journal of Transport Geography, 7(2), 121–134. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0966-6923(98)00038-6 
IATA. (2016). IATA Forecasts Passenger Demand to Double Over 20 Years. 
Retrieved from http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2016-10-18-02.aspx 
ICAO. (2004). DOC 9626: Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport 
Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (2nd Edition). Montreal, 
Canada: Secretary General. Retrieved from 
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/Doc 9626_en.pdf 
25 
 
Ison, S., Francis, G., Humphreys, I., & Page, R. (2011). UK regional airport 
commercialisation and privatisation: 25years on. Journal of Transport 
Geography, 19(6), 1341–1349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2011.06.005 
Janecke, H. (2010). Practice papers Managing and delivering an airport privatisation 
programme: Case study of the Republic of Congo. Management, 5(1), 10–18. 
Niemeier, H. M. (2002). Regulation of airports: The case of Hamburg airport- A view 
from the perspective of regional policy. Journal of Air Transport Management, 
8(1), 37–48. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-6997(01)00038-2 
OPEC. (2017). Saudi Arabia facts and figures. Retrieved from 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm 
Oum, T. H., Adler, N. & Yu, C. (2006). Privatization, corporatization, ownership 
forms and their effects on the performance of the world’s major airports. Journal 
of Air Transport Management, 12(3), 109–121. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2005.11.003 
Perelman, S., & Serebrisky, T. (2012). Measuring the technical efficiency of airports 
in Latin America. Utilities Policy, 22, 1–7. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2012.02.001 
Rikhy, A., Roberts, J. & Cheung, S. (2014). Global Airport Privatisation: Trends, 
recent developments and challenges ahead. Journal of Airport Management, 
8(4), 300–304. Retrieved from 
http://www.transecongroup.org/Transport_Economist_25-3.pdf 
TAV (2011). TAV Airports signed the contract for Medina Airport. Retrieved March 
20, 2017, from http://www.tavhavalimanlari.com.tr/en-
EN/Pages/Announcements.aspx?aID=101 
Tibah (2012). Tibah Airport Annual Report 2012. Tibah Airports Co. LTD 
unpublished raw data 
Tibah (2013). Tibah Airport Annual Report 2013. Tibah Airports Co. LTD 
unpublished raw data 
Tibah (2014). Tibah Airport Annual Report 2014. Tibah Airports Co. LTD 
unpublished raw data 
Tibah (2015). Tibah Airport Annual Report 2015. Tibah Airports Co. LTD 
unpublished raw data 
Tibah (2016). Tibah Airport Annual Report 2016. Tibah Airports Co. LTD 
unpublished raw data 
Vasign, B., Haririan, M., (2003). An empirical investigation of financial and 
operational efficiency of private versus public airports. Journal of Air 
Transportation, 4(4), 91–110 
Vogel, H. A. (2011). Do privatized airports add financial value? Research in 
Transportation Business and Management, 1(1), 15–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2011.05.002 
26 
 
World Economic Forum. (2016). The Global Competitiveness Report (Vol. 5). 
http://doi.org/92-95044-35-5 
Youssef, W. (2013). Case study: The privatisation of Madinah Airport, Saudi Arabia. 
Journal of Airport Management, 7(3), 231–236. 
Zakrzewski, D. & Juchan, R. (2006). Privatization impact and social disclosure: The 
case of Sydney airport. Journal of the Asia Pacific Centre for Environmental 
Accountability, 12(4), 4–12. 
